Human-ities · Philosophy · Technology

THE SOUND OF TERROR: PHENOMENOLOGY OF A DRONE STRIKE

“The drones were terrifying. From the ground, it is impossible to determine who or what they are tracking as they circle overhead. The buzz of a distant propeller is a constant reminder of imminent death.” This account of what a drone feels and sounds like from the ground comes from David Rohde, a journalist who was kidnapped and held by the Taliban for seven months in 2008. Yet this kind of report rarely registers in debates in the United States over the use of drones. Instead these debates seem to have reached an impasse. Opponents of drone strikes say they violate international law and have caused unacknowledged civilian deaths. Proponents insist they actually save the lives of both U.S. soldiers, who would otherwise be deployed in dangerous ground operations, and of civilians, because of the drone’s capacity to survey and strike more precisely than combat. If the alternative is a prolonged and messy ground operation, the advantage of drone strikes in terms of casualties is indisputable, and it is not my intention to dispute it here.

But the terms of this debate give a one-sided view of both the larger financial and political costs of drones, as well as the less than lethal but nonetheless chronic and intense harm continuous strikes wage on communities. This myopia restricts our understanding of the full effects of drones; in order to widen our vision, I provide a phenomenology of drone strikes, examining both how the world appears through the lens of a drone camera and the experience of the people on the ground. What is it like to watch a drone’s footage, or to wait below for it to strike? What does the drone’s camera capture, and what does it occlude?

Excerpt from an article written by Nasser Hussain at the Boston Review. Continue THERE

Bio · Human-ities · Philosophy · Theory

The Role of Bodily Perception in Emotion: In Defense of an Impure Somatic Theory

In this paper, we develop an impure somatic theory of emotion, according to which emotions are constituted by the integration of bodily perceptions with representations of external objects, events, or states of affairs. We put forward our theory by contrasting it with Prinz’s (2004) pure somatic theory, according to which emotions are entirely constituted by bodily perceptions. After illustrating Prinz’s theory and discussing the evidence in its favor, we show that it is beset by serious problems—i.e., it gets the neural correlates of emotion wrong, it isn’t able to distinguish emotions from bodily perceptions that aren’t emotions, it cannot account for emotions being directed towards particular objects, and it mischaracterizes emotion phenomenology. We argue that our theory accounts for the empirical evidence considered by Prinz and solves the problems faced by his theory. In particular, we maintain that our theory gives a unified and principled account of the relation between emotions and bodily perceptions, the intentionality of emotions, and emotion phenomenology.

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Architectonic · Art/Aesthetics · Human-ities · Philosophy · Technology

“The uncanny, phenomenology’s bad trip”

N 1919, SIGMUND FREUD devoted a brief essay to “The Uncanny” (das Unheimliche). Pages of dictionary definitions were followed by a long literary analysis of E.T.A. Hoffmann’s fantastic 1816 story “The Sandman,” in which a young medical student is threatened by various doubles of mad scientists and perfidious salesmen of glasses and optical instruments, falls in love with what turns out to be a mechanical doll, goes mad and finally kills himself. Examples of the uncanny, taken from Freud’s own experience as well from literature and superstition, included getting lost in the woods and always ending up in the same place, déjà vu, missing body parts, dead objects that turn out to be alive, the fear of being buried alive, meeting one’s double, the evil eye, and so on. From all this, Freud concluded that the uncanny is a mild shade of anxiety or unease that arises when the familiar suddenly appears strange. This occurs when something in the familiar experience or object triggers the return of repressed complexes (for example, castration anxiety), or when certain primitive ideas (for example, the belief that inanimate objects are animated) seem to be reconfirmed. “Among instances of frightening things there must be one class in which the frightening element can be shown to be something repressed which recurs,” Freud wrote:

This class of frightening things would then constitute the uncanny; […] if this is indeed the secret nature of the uncanny, we can understand why linguistic usage has extended das Heimliche [“homely”] into its opposite, das Unheimliche; for this uncanny is in reality nothing new or alien, but something which is familiar and old-established in the mind and which has become alienated from it only through the process of repression.

Excerpt from a review by Anneleen Masschelein on The Memory of Place : A Phenomenology of the Uncanny, LABR. Continue HERE

Art/Aesthetics · Events · Performativity · Technology

LIVE INTERFACES: Performance, Art, Music

Live Interfaces is a conference on live, technology-mediated interaction in performance. The conference seeks to investigate cross-disciplinary understandings of performance technology with a particular focus on issues related to the notion of liveness in interaction.

Live Interfaces will consist of paper and poster presentations, performances and workshops over two days. Researchers, theorists and artists from diverse fields are encouraged to participate, including: digital performance, live art, computer music, choreography, music psychology, interaction design, human computer interaction, digital aesthetics, computer vision, smart materials and augmented stage technology.

We invite submissions addressing the conference theme of technology-mediated live interaction in performance, and suggest the following indicative topics:

– Audience perception/interaction
– Biophysical sensors
– Brain-computer interfaces
– Computer vision/real-time video in performance
– Cross-modal perception/illusion
– Digital dramaturgy/choreography/composition
– Digital performance phenomenology
– Gesture recognition and control
– Historical perspectives
– Live coding in music, video animation and/or dance
– Participatory performance
– Performance technology aesthetics
– Redefining audience interaction
– Tangible interaction

CALL FOR PAPERS AND PERFORMANCES